The Efficiency of Business Group(Chaebol) and Shareholder Wealth Maximization : An Analysis of Equity Issues
Jun-Koo Kang
Jae-Seung Baek
Using a large sample of rights offerings by firms belonging to top 30 Korean business groups (chaebols) during the 1987-1999 period, we examine tunneling/propping effects within affiliated firms , We find that the announcement return of rights offerings by a poorly performing chaebol-affiliated firm is significant and positive and that its return is significantly and negatively related to the abnormal return for the value-weighted portfolio of other non-issuing firms in the same group. These findings support the tunneling view for chaebols In contrast, other cases show significant and positive return relations between issuing firms and non-issuing firms in the same group, supporting the propping view for chaebols. Taken together, our results suggest that there is propping alongside tunneling within chaebols.
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