LOG IN⠴ݱâ

  • ȸ¿ø´ÔÀÇ ¾ÆÀ̵ð¿Í Æнº¿öµå¸¦ ÀÔ·ÂÇØ ÁÖ¼¼¿ä.
  • ȸ¿øÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï½Ã¸é ¾Æ·¡ [ȸ¿ø°¡ÀÔ]À» ´­·¯ ȸ¿ø°¡ÀÔÀ» ÇØÁֽñ⠹ٶø´Ï´Ù.

¾ÆÀ̵ð ÀúÀå

   

¾ÆÀ̵ð Áߺ¹°Ë»ç⠴ݱâ

HONGGIDONG ˼
»ç¿ë °¡´ÉÇÑ È¸¿ø ¾ÆÀ̵ð ÀÔ´Ï´Ù.

E-mail Áߺ¹È®ÀÎ⠴ݱâ

honggildong@naver.com ˼
»ç¿ë °¡´ÉÇÑ E-mail ÁÖ¼Ò ÀÔ´Ï´Ù.

¿ìÆí¹øÈ£ °Ë»ö⠴ݱâ

°Ë»ö

SEARCH⠴ݱâ

ºñ¹Ð¹øÈ£ ã±â

¾ÆÀ̵ð

¼º¸í

E-mail

ÇмúÀÚ·á °Ë»ö

The real impact of ratings-based capital rules on the finance-growth nexus

  • Iftekhar Hasan Fordham University and Bank of Finland 45 Columbus Avenue, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10023
  • Gazi Hassan Waikato University Hamilton, New Zealand
  • Suk-Joong Kim Discipline of Finance University of Sydney Business School, University of Sydney, Australia
  • Eliza Wu Discipline of Finance University of Sydney Business School, University of Sydney, Australia
We investigate whether ratings-based capital regulation has affected the finance-growth nexus via the foreign credit channel. Using quarterly data on short to medium term real GDP growth and cross-border bank lending flows from G-10 country banks to 67 borrower countries over time, we find that since the implementation of Basel 2 capital rules, risk weight reductions mapped to sovereign credit rating upgrades have led to significant economic growth in investment grade countries. However, rating upgrades large enough to reduce risk weights had the opposite impact of significantly reducing growth in non-investment grade borrower countries. We point this to a combination higher levels of risk taking by lending banks and the financial market underdevelopment in the borrower countries. The impact of rating upgrades is strongest over the one year growth horizon and then tend to reduce or even reverse over longer horizons. On the other hand, there is a consistent and lasting negative impact of risk weight increases due to downgrades across both types of borrower countries. The adverse effects of capital regulation on bank credit supply and economic growth are compounded with more corruption and less competitive banking sectors but ameliorated with greater political stability.

  • Iftekhar Hasan
  • Gazi Hassan
  • Suk-Joong Kim
  • Eliza Wu
We investigate whether ratings-based capital regulation has affected the finance-growth nexus via the foreign credit channel. Using quarterly data on short to medium term real GDP growth and cross-border bank lending flows from G-10 country banks to 67 borrower countries over time, we find that since the implementation of Basel 2 capital rules, risk weight reductions mapped to sovereign credit rating upgrades have led to significant economic growth in investment grade countries. However, rating upgrades large enough to reduce risk weights had the opposite impact of significantly reducing growth in non-investment grade borrower countries. We point this to a combination higher levels of risk taking by lending banks and the financial market underdevelopment in the borrower countries. The impact of rating upgrades is strongest over the one year growth horizon and then tend to reduce or even reverse over longer horizons. On the other hand, there is a consistent and lasting negative impact of risk weight increases due to downgrades across both types of borrower countries. The adverse effects of capital regulation on bank credit supply and economic growth are compounded with more corruption and less competitive banking sectors but ameliorated with greater political stability.
finance-growth nexus,cross-border banking,sovereign credit ratings,Basel 2,ratings-based capital regulation.