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Information Asymmetry, Corporate Dividend Policies, and Risky Firms

  • Sunhyun Kim Inha University, Incheon, Republic of Korea
  • Jin-Young Jung Assistant Professor of Finance, College of Business Administration, Inha University, Incheon, Korea.
This study holds a significant meaning in that it verified a positive relationship between information asymmetry level and dividend level using direct information asymmetry models(GH and HFV) that were studied in the context of market microstructure, and it expanded on the results of the preceding studies in further details by adopting beta coefficient as a proxy variable for firms¡¯ risk level. We also find that higher firms¡¯ risk level is the more positive effects information asymmetry has on dividends. Furthermore firms with low risk level witness weak reactions from investors on dividend decisions, and less financial constraints. An interesting outcome is that firms¡¯ risk itself has a negative effect on dividends, but when this risk is combined with information asymmetry, the effect turns positive with a growing risk level.

  • Sunhyun Kim
  • Jin-Young Jung
This study holds a significant meaning in that it verified a positive relationship between information asymmetry level and dividend level using direct information asymmetry models(GH and HFV) that were studied in the context of market microstructure, and it expanded on the results of the preceding studies in further details by adopting beta coefficient as a proxy variable for firms¡¯ risk level. We also find that higher firms¡¯ risk level is the more positive effects information asymmetry has on dividends. Furthermore firms with low risk level witness weak reactions from investors on dividend decisions, and less financial constraints. An interesting outcome is that firms¡¯ risk itself has a negative effect on dividends, but when this risk is combined with information asymmetry, the effect turns positive with a growing risk level.