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Centrality and Corporate Governance Decisions of Korean chaebols : Social Network Approach

  • Jin Q Jeon Dongguk Business School Dongguk University
  • Cheolwoo Lee College of Business Ferris State University
  • Chan-Kyoo Park Dongguk Business School Dongguk University
Almeida et al. (2011) show how Korean chaebols are structured using the critical control threshold centrality. In this paper, we introduce the social network theory to operationalize centrality in the context of the organizational structure of a business group. Specifically, the degree centrality, the Katz centrality and the Hub/Authority centrality are employed to show how chaebols make corporate governance decisions?going public, staying private, and being divested?in terms of centrality. We find that firms with high centrality are more likely to go public while firms with low centrality are more likely to stay private or be divested. Specifically, firms invested by other group firms tend to stay private and firms without substantial equity stake in other group firms tend to be divested. We calibrate centrality based on the social network theory and explore how Korean chaebol system evolves for survival and prosperity.

  • Jin Q Jeon
  • Cheolwoo Lee
  • Chan-Kyoo Park
Almeida et al. (2011) show how Korean chaebols are structured using the critical control threshold centrality. In this paper, we introduce the social network theory to operationalize centrality in the context of the organizational structure of a business group. Specifically, the degree centrality, the Katz centrality and the Hub/Authority centrality are employed to show how chaebols make corporate governance decisions?going public, staying private, and being divested?in terms of centrality. We find that firms with high centrality are more likely to go public while firms with low centrality are more likely to stay private or be divested. Specifically, firms invested by other group firms tend to stay private and firms without substantial equity stake in other group firms tend to be divested. We calibrate centrality based on the social network theory and explore how Korean chaebol system evolves for survival and prosperity.
Korean chaebol,Ownership Structure,Social Network Analysis,Going Public,Divesture