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Asian Review of Financial Research, Vol., No..
pp.82~126
pp.82~126
Perils of Limiting the Coverage of Mandatory Pay Disclosure : The Korean Experience
Jinhyeok Ra Korea University Business School
Woochan Kim Professor of Finance, Korea University Business School; Research Associate, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
This study documents the danger of limiting the coverage of mandatory pay disclosure. Exploiting the 2013 rule change in Korea, we find that its restrictive coverage, confined to board members with total annual pay exceeding 500 million Korean won, led a large fraction of family executives to evade disclosure through deregistration (i.e., stepping down from the board). We also find that such evasion is mostly carried out by family executives in firms with high executive-to-worker pay ratios. If the original pay level is close to the threshold, we find that family executives choose pay-cuts over deregistration, as their preferred means of evasion.
Jinhyeok Ra
Woochan Kim
This study documents the danger of limiting the coverage of mandatory pay disclosure. Exploiting the 2013 rule change in Korea, we find that its restrictive coverage, confined to board members with total annual pay exceeding 500 million Korean won, led a large fraction of family executives to evade disclosure through deregistration (i.e., stepping down from the board). We also find that such evasion is mostly carried out by family executives in firms with high executive-to-worker pay ratios. If the original pay level is close to the threshold, we find that family executives choose pay-cuts over deregistration, as their preferred means of evasion.
executive compensation,disclosure evasion,family executives,executive-to-worker pay ratio