재무연구 제 권 호 (2018년 5월)
Asian Review of Financial Research, Vol., No..
pp.1662~1677
pp.1662~1677
Agency Problem of the Firm with the Presence of Preferred Stock
Jinho Jeong Division of Business Administration, College of Global Business Korea University Sejong Campus, Korea
Yonghyun Kwon Division of Business Administration, College of Global Business Korea University Sejong Campus, Korea
This study examines whether there are agency conflicts within firms that issue preferred stocks, and whether agency conflicts affect to tax avoidance levels of the firm. Firms with preferred stocks have agency problems because they can consolidate managers’ rights compared to firms with only common stocks. This paper studies the degree of tax avoidance of firms that issue preferred stocks and finds that because of the existence of differentiated voting rights in the firm, the degree of tax avoidance is reduced.
Jinho Jeong
Yonghyun Kwon
This study examines whether there are agency conflicts within firms that issue preferred stocks, and whether agency conflicts affect to tax avoidance levels of the firm. Firms with preferred stocks have agency problems because they can consolidate managers’ rights compared to firms with only common stocks. This paper studies the degree of tax avoidance of firms that issue preferred stocks and finds that because of the existence of differentiated voting rights in the firm, the degree of tax avoidance is reduced.
