À繫¿¬±¸ Á¦ ±Ç È£ (2018³â 5¿ù)
Asian Review of Financial Research, Vol., No..
pp.970~1010
pp.970~1010
Compensation structure of family business groups
Hohyun Kim School of Business and Technology Management, College of Business, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)
Seung Hun Han School of Business and Technology Management, College of Business, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)
We examine executive compensation structures with a focus on family business groups in Korea. Our results show that Korean family business groups provide 60% more total compensation to CEOs who are family members than to professional CEOs. This excessive increment is not based on performance-contingent payments, but on fixed payments. Our propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analyses robustly support these results. Further, we find that operation of internal capital markets, CEO talents, CEO stock ownership, and family board membership do not explain the excessive compensation of family CEOs in family business groups. The evidence indicates rent extraction through executive compensation in family business groups.
Hohyun Kim
Seung Hun Han
We examine executive compensation structures with a focus on family business groups in Korea. Our results show that Korean family business groups provide 60% more total compensation to CEOs who are family members than to professional CEOs. This excessive increment is not based on performance-contingent payments, but on fixed payments. Our propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analyses robustly support these results. Further, we find that operation of internal capital markets, CEO talents, CEO stock ownership, and family board membership do not explain the excessive compensation of family CEOs in family business groups. The evidence indicates rent extraction through executive compensation in family business groups.