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The Effect of Firm Characteristics on Firm-Bank Relationships

  • Sang Wook Lee
This paper analyzes the firm-bank relationship from a borrower (firm)¡¯s perspective using the data of Korea¡¯ s listed firms and banks in transaction relationships (say related banks). For the analysis, I use a number of related banks or the of dependence of a firm on the main bank as measurements of firm-bank relationship. Further, the more related bank means that the firm has many ties with banks, which implies the firm can make new relationship with new bank easily. However, each tie is weak in the strength. In the other hands, the more dependence on the main bank means that the firm has the deeper relationship with the main bank. The firm characteristics for the analysis are classified into four categories. The first includes the information asymmetries on the borrower. Firm size, firm history and proportion of tangible assets among total assets are used to capture the information asymmetries. In particular, the firm with bigger size or longer history might have lower information asymmetries in the loan market. The more tangible asset of a firm, often hold as a mortgage in the loan contract, also could decrease the information asymmetries in loan market. The second category includes the performance and the risk of the borrower. ROA and the interest expenses-sales ratio capture the performance and the risk of the firm respectively. The firm showing better performance or with lower risks has less trouble to make a new relationship with new banks. However, these variables does not indicate the depth of relationship between a firm and banks. The third includes the characteristics regarding the growth and investment of a firm. Growth rate in sales and average growth rate in sales for recent five years are used to capture the growth characteristic of a firm. Further, investment activity of a firm is measured by the increase in tangible asset divided by total asset of a firm. Since the firm with fast growth and intensive investment is more likely to have the higher information asymmetries in the loan market, the firm might have trouble to raise funds from banks except the main bank. Therefore, we expect that the growth and investment of a firm are loosely related to the depth of relationship with banks. The fourth is the financial soundness, which is important factor to determine the firm-bank relationship. The financially sounder firm can raise funds easily from only limited numbers of banks. Thus, the sounder financial status of a firm implies the deeper relationship with banks. Since the paper analyzes the firm-bank relationship in the firm¡¯s perspective, I control the characteristics of banks for the analysis using variables like ROA and size of main bank. To control the effects of firm¡¯s dependency on the bank loan, size of bank loans of a firm divided by total liabilities is used. Furthermore, year and industry dummies are included to control the effects of macro economic condition or industry characteristics. The result of empirical analysis shows that borrower with lower information asymmetries is easier to find new relationships with banks and has lower dependency on the main bank. Tuning to the performance and risk of a firm, the firm showing better performance or with lower risks is easier to find new relationship with banks and has lower dependency of the main banks. However, a firm with fast growth and intensive investment is more likely dependent on the main bank to raise funds. Also the result suggest that a firm with the sounder financial status has the smaller number of related banks and the higher dependence on the main bank. In summary, borrower with lower information asymmetries, better performance, and lower risks is more likely to have multiple ties with banks than growth-oriented (or investment-oriented) firms. However, the dependency on the main bank is stronger in growth-oriented (or investment-oriented) firms. In addition, the financial soundness make strengthen the relationship between the borrower and the main bank. It is a common belief that the alleviation of information asymmetry in the loan market can improve the intermediary role of banks. Also the strengthening of main bank stimulates the growth or investment of small-medium enterprise. Moreover, financial soundness of firms is crucial to strengthen the firm-bank relationship and enhance the intermediary role of banks. The analysis in this paper using Korean data empirically supports these common beliefs. However, this paper has several limitations to be improved in future researches. The empirical results are obtained from the recent Korean data, and the time-span of data is not sufficient. Therefore, more rigorous studies are required to generalize the result of this paper. Further, although simple test of correlation among variables shows that endogenous problem is negligible, still the endogenous problem could exist.
Firm-Bank Relationship,Information Asymmetry,Number Of Related Banks,Main Bank